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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
In the short-term, the Russian economy confronts the following dilemma.
On the one hand, there are important reasons (huge foreign debt and
acute social problems) for increasing budgetary expenses. On the other
hand, according to general opinion, tax rates should be reduced be-
cause it is impossible to work honestly under the present rates.
One possible solution to this dilemma relates to the fact that an essential
part of the economy does not pay taxes now. According to estimates by
the World Bank and IMF experts, the actual tax revenue in 1999 was less
than 50% of the level corresponding to the honest behavior of taxpayers.
Reduction of tax rates by itself would not increase tax revenues. Those
who do not pay would not pay, and those who pay would pay less. The
only real way to solve this dilemma is by simultaneously optimizing the
tax rates and audit strategy.
Our basic model considers a group of taxpayers with random, independ-
ent and equally distributed incomes. All taxpayers and the government
know the distribution of income from the beginning of the tax period. At
some time before paying tax, each taxpayer finds out her own income
and sends a (not necessarily true) report to the government. The gov-
ernment does not know who has what actual income. It may audit a tax-
payer in order to verify her reported income. An audit always determines
a taxpayer's true income and has a fixed cost. The government collects
taxes through the following mechanism. It sets a tax schedule dependent
on reported income, a penalty schedule dependent on actual and re-
ported incomes, and the probability of inspection dependent on individ-
ual's reported income.
Our purpose is to study the tax optimization problem in the "principal-
agent" framework, that is, to find the government strategy that maxi-
mizes net tax revenue under the optimal behavior of agents (i.e. taxpay-
ers) and the following participation constraints. The expected income of
an agent should exceed a fixed desirable level. Under the worst possible
outcome, the income of an agent should exceed a minimal level neces-
sary for her "survival".
We consider the following variants of the penalty constraints: a) penalty
is proportional to detected unpaid tax, b) net penalty (except the due
tax) is proportional to hidden income; c) penalty is limited to the given
minimal income of a taxpayer; d) penalty is proportional to detected hid-
den income.
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Our main results are as follows. It is always optimal to set the maximal
lump-sum tax under the above mentioned constraints. If the taxpayer's
income variance is relatively small, then introducing any other additional
tax does not increase net revenue. But if the income distribution is widely
dispersed and the cost of an audit is relatively low, then the optimal eva-
sion-proof strategy of the government is as follows. According to the op-
timal tax schedule, for all incomes below some threshold the after-tax in-
come is equal to the minimal level specified by participation constraint,
and for all higher incomes the tax schedule is flat. The optimal audit
strategy is a known "cut-off" rule: reports below the threshold are
audited with the minimal probability that makes tax evasion unprofitable
and the rest of the reports are not audited. In some sense the optimal
contract does not depend on the penalty rule: it does not matter if the
penalty is proportional to the evaded tax or hidden income, or includes
both components. The sum of the penalty coefficients determines the
probability of an audit and the threshold level of income.
An important issue is whether the specified tax scheme is optimal in
general, that is, the optimal tax policy of the government is always eva-
sion-proof. In contrast to the conventional point of view, we found that
the optimal government strategy permits tax evasion for some distribu-
tions under the mentioned penalty schemes a or b. This happens if there
are two possible levels of income, its variance is neither very high, nor
very low, and the penalty for evasion is sufficiently soft. However, for
typical continuous distributions of income, the optimal evasion-proof
contract is optimal in general (at least, if the penalty is proportional to
the evaded tax). The same proposition is true for any distributions under
constraints c or d.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Informational asymmetries between the government and the taxpayer
generate important constraints on the choice of tax policy. In much of
the recent literature on optimal income taxation (Reinganum and Wilde,
1985; Border and Sobel, 1987; Chander and Wilde, 1998 and others),
individual incomes are treated as exogenous. Informational constraints
arise since an individual's income cannot be directly observed. It can
only be verified through a costly audit. In this setting a government strat-
egy must include, besides tax rates, an audit strategy and a scheme of
penalties for misreporting income. This opens up interesting questions
regarding the interaction of optimal tax rates, audit strategy, participation
and penalty constraints.
Early optimal income tax results (see Atkinson, Stiglitz, 1980) primarily
relate to the case where all taxpayers are risk-neutral, their participation
constraints concern expected after-tax incomes, and the government
knows the type of every agent, in particular, her probabilistic distribution
of income. In this situation, informational asymmetry is not essential: ac-
cording to the Welfare theorem (ibid.), the government can reach the
first best result by means of a type-specific lump-sum tax, and an audit
is unnecessary.
However, in practice taxpayers cannot be completely risk-neutral under
any tax policy. For instance, for a firm there typically exists a threshold
income (dependent on its type) such that, if after-tax income falls below
this value, then the firm cannot obtain access to credit and becomes
bankrupt. Previous models of optimal taxation under tax evasion
(Chander and Wilde, 1998; Mookherjee and Png, 1989) take this condi-
tion into account in the form of a participation constraint. In this case, in-
come after paying taxes and possibly fines is required to be non-
negative in all circumstances, as if the firm became infinitely risk averse
for outcomes below the threshold. The optimal tax in general depends
on a taxpayer's income, and the determination of the optimal tax policy
becomes a non-trivial task.
It should be noted that most of the literature on optimal tax enforcement
either restricts attention to linear tax schedules or considers fixed taxes
and penalties (see Cremer, Marchand and Pistieau, 1990; Sanchez and
Sobel, 1993).
Mookherjee and Png (1989) study the tax enforcement problem in a
contract theory-type setting. They consider risk averse taxpayers and in-
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clude a moral hazard problem. Their model permits arbitrary tax and
penalty schedules, subject to participation constraints. Their results show
that such an approach has some disadvantages: the optimal penalty
schedule is to fine a tax evader an amount equal to her entire income,
irrespective of the amount of income that was concealed. Such a draco-
nian rule is unavailable in practice. Moreover, as Chander and Wilde
(1998, p. 177) mention, it is unrealistic to assume that penalties are a
choice variable of the tax authorities. Actual penalties may be con-
strained, for instance, by the common ethical norm of letting the pun-
ishment fit the crime.
Chander and Wilde (1998) consider the tax optimization problem for risk
neutral taxpayers with an exogenous income distribution. Proceeding
from the previous argument, they consider another type of penalty con-
straint: the penalty payment after an audit is equal to the hidden income.
They introduce the notion of an efficient scheme including tax, penalty
and auditing probability functions such that any other scheme does not
allow an increase in the expected payment of any taxpayer without in-
creasing the probabilities of auditing for some reported income. They
show that it is possible to restrict attention to evasion-proof schemes
and to establish their general properties: the tax function is non-
decreasing with a non-increasing average tax rate; audit probabilities are
determined by marginal payment rates and are non-increasing.
They show that it is possible to restrict attention to evasion-proof
schemes and to establish their general properties: the tax function is
non-decreasing with a non-increasing average tax rate; audit probabili-
ties are determined by marginal payment rates and are non-increasing.
Let us note that the tax optimization problem has been studied under
penalty constraints that are not used in practice. Typically, identified tax
evaders repay the detected unpaid tax and also pay some penalty. In
several countries this penalty is proportional to the unpaid tax, in some
others (including Russia) it is proportional to the hidden income. As far
as we know, there are no prior results establishing the optimality of eva-
sion-proof contracts given these constraints. Moreover, the previous lit-
erature establishes the general properties of the optimal tax schedules
but does not provide a tool for their determination.
The present paper will study the tax optimization problem under various
penalty constraints and determine the optimal tax schedules depending
on the characteristics of the taxpayers. We will find under what condi-
tions the optimal government strategy is evasion-proof, and alternatively,
possible reasons for the government to permit tax evasion.
Our basic model includes the government and a group of taxpayers with
identical but independent random distributions of incomes. The govern-
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ment (the principal) and each taxpayer (the agent) know the income dis-
tribution. At some time before paying tax, the agent finds out her own in-
come. But the government does not know who has what income. An
agent makes a report of her income to the principal, while the principal
may audit an agent in order to verify her income. An audit always deter-
mines the taxpayer's actual income, and each audit involves a fixed cost.
The government collects taxes through the following mechanism. It sets
a tax schedule (or schedule of pre-audit payments) dependent on the
reported income, and a penalty schedule (or post-audit payment sched-
ule) dependent on the actual and reported incomes. The government
also chooses the probability of inspection, dependent on the reported
income.
Our purpose is to study the tax optimization problem in this principal-
agent framework, that is, to find the government strategy that maximizes
expected net tax revenue (net of auditing costs) under the optimal be-
havior of agents and the participation constraints related to the tax-
payer's income. We assume that every taxpayer is risk-neutral and aims
to maximize her expected after-tax income. We consider two types of
participation constraints, one based on expected after-tax and penalty
income, and the second based on realized after-tax and penalty income:
(1) The expected income of an agent under her optimal behavior should
exceed a fixed level, called her "alternative income". An otherwise
unconstrained expected revenue maximizing government would find it
desirable to leave a taxpayer with her alternative income.
(2) Since the income of every agent is a random variable, we require that
under optimal behavior and the worst random outcome, the actual
(not expected) income of an agent should exceed a minimal value
necessary for the "survival" of the taxpayer.
Further, we consider the following variants of permissible penalties im-
posed upon detected tax evaders: a) the penalty is proportional to the
detected, unpaid tax; b) the "pure" penalty is proportional to the hidden
income; c) the penalty is bounded because of the required minimal af-
ter-tax and penalty income of an agent; and, d) the payment after an
audit is proportional to the detected hidden income.
Our main results are as follows. The optimal contract is always evasion-
proof under the penalty constraints c and d. Some tax evasion may be
optimal, however, for a net revenue maximizing government if there are
two possible levels of income; the pure penalty is proportional to the un-
paid tax or hidden income (penalty variants a and b) and the proportion-
ality coefficient is sufficiently low. Among evasion-proof strategies the
optimal tax is either equal to the entire income above the minimal level
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for small incomes and is flat for higher incomes, or it is flat for all in-
comes. In the former case, the optimal audit strategy is a probabilistic
cut-off rule (cf. Sanchez and Sobel, 1993): every reported income below
some threshold is audited with a probability that makes underreporting
unprofitable, and every higher report is not audited. Under penalty con-
straint a and general assumptions on the density of the income distribu-
tion, the optimal evasion-proof strategy is optimal in general.
We generalize some of these results for an important extension of the
basic model where the result of an audit depends not only on govern-
ment effort but also depends on its ratio to the total and hidden income
of the taxpayer.
The new contribution of our paper to the existing literature is as follows.
Besides the penalty schemes c and d, studied by CW, we consider two
other practically important variants and show that the optimal contract is
not necessarily evasion-proof. We examine how this property depends
on the penalty coefficients, minimum alternative income and other pa-
rameters of the model. We obtain transparent results on the optimal
government strategies, including the explicit tax schedules and audit
rules. We study a more general model where the result of an audit de-
pends on the relationship between an auditor's effort and the real and
reported income, and we generalize the results of CW on the optimality
of evasion-proof contracts for this setting.
The major assumptions that limit the generality of our analysis are stan-
dard in the literature and are also used by CW. As in most of the litera-
ture, we rule out supply side effects of income taxation. We do not think
that introducing supply effects would essentially change our results. As
Mirrlees (1971) shows, these effects may only reinforce the regressivity
of optimal tax schedules. Our optimal tax schedule, however, is already
extremely regressive.
The other major assumption is that taxpayers are risk neutral. Since we
focus on the taxation of firms and the participation constraint prevents
tax bankruptcy, this condition seems to be not very restrictive.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2.1 we define the basic
model. Section 2.2 solves the tax optimization problem for the case of
two possible levels of income and determines under what conditions tax
evasion is profitable for the government. The optimal evasion-proof con-
tract for different penalty constraints is determined in Section 2.3. In
Section 3 we study an extension of the basic model where the result of
an audit depends not only on the government effort but also on its ratio
to the total and hidden income of the taxpayer. Section 3.2 shows that
the optimal contract is still evasion-proof under constraints c or d. In
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Section 3.3 we explore the general contract approach and show that
there always exists an optimal simple contract under constraint c. Sec-
tion 4 concludes with several remarks and policy implications related to
the Russian economy. Technical proofs of several propositions are given
in Appendix.
2. A BASIC MODEL
2.1. Model specification. The first best solution
We consider an interaction between the government and a group of tax-
payers. The income I  of each taxpayer is an independent random value
with distribution function ( )G I  concentrated in the interval [ , ]L HI I . The
taxpayer's income is private information. A government strategy Gs , or
simple contract, includes three components: a non-decreasing tax func-
tion ( )rT I  where ∈( ) [ , ]r LI I I I  is reported income, an audit probability
∈( ) [0,1]rp I  and a penalty function ( , )rF I I  that determines the additional
payment of the agent depending on her actual and reported incomes. In
this version of the model, an audit always reveals the true income and its
costs is fixed.
Under a given government strategy, each taxpayer aims to maximize her
expected income. So, depending on her actual income, her reported in-
come is
→ + =( , ) min{ ( ) ( ) ( , )} ( , )
r
def
r G r r r eff G
I
I I s T I p I F I I T I s . (2.1.1)
The value on the right-hand side is the effective tax, or the expected to-
tal payment from an agent with income I under strategy sG.
The problem of the government is to maximize expected tax revenue net
of auditing costs1
{ ( , ) [ ( , )]} ( ) max
H
G
L
I
eff G r G
s
I
T I s cp I I s dG I− →∫ (2.1.2)
                                               
1 In general tax revenue maximization is not the main purpose of the government.
Another typical setting is that the government aims to maximize a social welfare
function dependent on the after-tax income of taxpayers and net tax revenue (cf.
Atkinson, Stiglitz, 1980). Then, the optimal strategy coincides with the solution of
our model under a certain value of alternative income.
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(below we omit the limits of integration) under the following participation
constraints:
[ ( , )] ( )eff G altI T I s dG I I− ≥∫ , (2.1.3)
that is, the expected income of an agent under her optimal behavior
should exceed her alternative income altI . The value altI  is a desirable
level of a taxpayer's expected income (from the point of view of the gov-
ernment) in our model. Another interpretation is that this is the expected
income of a firm if it moves its activity to another country or to an untax-
able field ("reservation" value of income). Note that a firm makes its
choice at the beginning of the tax period when only distribution ( )G I  (not
concrete income I) is known.
min[ ( )] [ , ( )]r rT I I F I I I I I+ ≤ −   if  [ ( )] 0rp I I > , (2.1.4a)
and
min[ ( )]rT I I I I≤ −   if  [ ( )] 1rp I I < , (2.1.4b)
that is, under optimal behavior and the worst random outcome, the in-
come should exceed the value minI which is necessary for the "survival"
of a taxpayer. In practice minI may be a threshold value such that if the
rest on the firm's account falls below this value, then the firm cannot get
credit and has to stop operating.
We consider several variants of penalty schemes:
a) ( , ) (1 )[ ( ) ( )]r a rF I I T I T Iδ= + −  (penalty is proportional to detected unpaid
tax);
b) δ= − + −( , ) ( ) ( ) ( )r r b rF I I T I T I I I  (net penalty is proportional to hidden in-
come);
c) ≤ ≤ − −
!
0 ( , ) ( )r rF I I I T I I  for any , rI I  (penalty is bounded because of
the given minimal income of an agent ≤
!
min( )I I  under the non-optimal
behavior of a taxpayer);
d) δ= −( , ) ( )r d rF I I I I  (the payment after audit is proportional to detected
hidden income).
Actually the government can choose the penalty only under condition c.
The first inequality in this constraint means that there are no premiums
either for telling the truth or for lying. This condition rules out the possi-
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bility of making enforcement costs arbitrarily small by offering the agents
a lottery where they get a large reward for telling the truth with small
probability and thus inducing them to use strategies preferable for the
government.2
The former two variants of penalty schemes correspond to the actual
legislation in different countries while the latter two are studied by CW.
Their results (see Section 1 and Lemma 3 on p.177) imply the following
theorem.
Theorem 2.1.1. Under penalty constraints c or d, there exists an evasion-
proof optimal government strategy for the problem (2.1.2 – 2.1.4), that
is, such a solution Gs  that =( , )r GI I s I  for any I . Moreover, the optimal
penalty is always the maximal one in the case c: = − −
!
( , ) ( )r rF I I I T I I  for
any ≠ rI I .
Note. CW consider only the case δ = 1d  for variant d, but their proof
holds true for any δ > 0d .
Section 2.2 below proves a similar result for the more general model of
an audit. The next section shows that the theorem is not true under pen-
alty constraints a or b when a certain level of tax evasion may be optimal
for the government.
The two values play a crucial role in the subsequent analysis of the
model.
= − min
def
LM LT I I
is the maximal possible tax on the lower income under the participation
constraint (2.1.4). This value characterizes the stability of a taxpayer un-
der the worst state of nature.
∆ = −∫ ( )def altEI IdG I I
is an expected before-tax surplus to an agent with respect to her alter-
native income. For a firm, this value characterizes the profitability of pro-
duction.
                                               
2 Tirole (1992) describes the corresponding contract in the general principal-
agent setting. CW do not require the specified inequality but assume only that
there are no large premiums for telling the truth. However, it is easy to see that
large premiums for a small lie may have the same effect. Moreover, we do not
consider even limited premiums since they create strong incentives for collusion
between the tax service and taxpayers.
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If we exclude the individual incentive constraint (2.1.1), assuming that
taxpayers do not evade, and set ≡( ) 0rp I , then we obtain the problem
for the first best solution of revenue maximization:
( )
[ (.)] ( ) ( ) max
T I
R T T I dG I= →∫ (2.1.5)
under constraints
≤ ∆∫ ( ) ( )T I dG I EI , (2.1.6)
≤ − ∈   min( ) , ,L HT I I I I I I . (2.1.7)
Obviously, this solution does not depend on the penalty constraint. Con-
sider the following expression for the tax function:
= + ∆( ) ( ) ( ),LT I T I T I
where ( )LT I  is a lump sum component paid by each taxpayer and
∆ ≥( ) 0T I  is an additional tax dependent on the income. Proceeding from
(2.1.7), ≤( )L LMT I T .
Proposition 2.1.2. The first best net tax revenue is equal to ∆EI . If
≥ ∆LMT EI , then the optimal government strategy for the original problem
(2.1.2 – 2.1.4) corresponds to the first best solution: ≡ ∆( )T I EI , ≡( ) 0.p I
Proof. According to constraint (2.1.7), ≤ ∆( )R I EI . If ≥ ∆LMT EI , then the
given strategy provides revenue ∆EI  and meets all constraints. Now
consider the case < ∆LMT EI . Let us find the first best solution. Consider
a function
min min( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[1 ( )]
L
I
I
R I I I dG I I I G I= − + − −∫
that determines the revenue for the tax schedule
min
min
,   if ,  
( )
,  if .
 
 
I I I I
T I
I I I I

− ≤
= 
− >
Note that ( )R I  is continuous in I  and
= < ∆ = − > ∆∫ min( ) , ( ) ( )L LM HR I T EI R I IdG I I EI .
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Hence, there exists a value I  such that = ∆( )R I EI .
Thus, whenever ≥ ∆LMT EI , the government can get the first best result
by means of the lump sum tax ≡ = ∆( ) LT I T EI . It is unnecessary to collect
any other taxes and organize audits. Proceeding from the previous dis-
cussion of conditions (2.1.3), (2.1.4), the inequality shows that the ex-
pected surplus is less than the maximal lump-sum payoff that does not
undermine the activity of a firm under unfavorable conditions. The case
< ∆LMT EI  is more sophisticated. The next section solves the problem for
one type of income distributions and shows that, under certain condi-
tions, the government can get the maximal revenue only if taxpayers
evade.
2.2. A model with two possible levels of income
Consider a group of taxpayers who earn a high income HI  with probabil-
ity q  and a low income LI  with probability −1 q . A government strategy
includes taxes LT  and HT  on these incomes, a probability p  of auditing
low income reports and a penalty F  on tax evasion (if this penalty is not
given exogenously). Denote
∆ = − ,
def
H LI I I  ∆ = − ≥ 0
def
H LT T T .
A taxpayer's strategy is her report ∈{ , }r L HI I I  that she sends if she earns
a high income. Since a taxpayer maximizes her expected income,
=r LI I   if  < ∆pF T ,  otherwise  =r HI I . (2.2.1)
The government aims to maximize expected net tax revenue, so the for-
mal problem is to find
∆
→
( , , , )
max
LT T F p
R , (2.2.2)
where = + ∆ − −(1 )LR T q T p q c  if ≥ ∆pF T , otherwise = + −LR T qpF pc .
Participation constraints take the form of
+ ∆ ≤ ∆ = + ∆ −min( , ) ,L L altT q T pF EI I q I I  (2.2.3)
≤ = − min;L LM LT T I I  − ≥ minH HI T I  if =r HI I , (2.2.4)
TAX OPTIMIZATION UNDER TAX EVASION16
otherwise − − ≥ minH LI T F I .
The four variants of the penalty constraints in this model look like
a) δ= + ∆(1 ) ;aF T
b) δ= ∆ + ∆ ;bF T I
c) + ∆ − − ∆ ≥
!
max( , )L LI I T T F I ;
d) δ= ∆ .dF I
If ≥ ∆LMT EI , that is equivalent to − ≥ ∆minaltI I q I , then, according to
Proposition 2.1.2, optimal net revenue = ∆*R EI  is the same for problem
(2.1.1) – (2.1.4) with any penalty constraint a – d and coincides with the
first best solution. The optimal government strategy is ∆ = 0T ,
= ∆ =, 0LT EI p .
If < ∆LMT EI , then the first best revenue value is the same but requires a
combination of the both kinds of taxes. Let us find solutions of the tax
optimization problem (2.2.1) – (2.2.4) for different penalty constraints.
a) δ= + ∆(1 )a aF T . Note that taxpayers evade in this case if
δ∆ > < = +*0, 1/(1 )
def
a aT p p .
The proposition below shows how the optimal government strategy de-
pends on the parameters of the model.
Proposition 2.2.1. First, consider the case where
< ∆c q I . (2.2.5)
Then, for any fixed ∆, ,c q I  and δa , there exist three variants of the op-
timal government strategy dependent on the difference − minaltI I . If
∆ ≤ − minaltq I I I , (2.2.6)
then the optimal strategy is to set lump-sum tax = ∆ = + ∆ −( )L L altT EI I q I I ,
∆ = =0, 0.T p
In the interval
min
1
1
1 alta
q
q I I I q Iδ
 −∆ − < − < ∆ 
+  (2.2.7)
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the optimal strategy includes the following: = ,L LMT T  the additional tax
∆ = ∆ *aT Ip  (hence, = ∆ )F I , the audit probability
∆ −
=
∆
LMEI Tp
q I
 *min1 alt a
I I
p
q I
− 
= − < ∆  .
The gross revenue gR  is ∆EI  (that is maximal under (2.2.3)), and the
net revenue = ∆ −R EI pc .
In the remaining interval
min
1
0 1
1alt a
q
I I q I
δ
 −
< − ≤ ∆ − 
+  , (2.2.8)
the optimal strategy is = ,L LMT T  =
*,ap p ∆ = ∆ −( ) /LMT EI T q . Honest be-
havior of taxpayers is optimal, and the gross revenue gR  is again ∆EI
while the net revenue = ∆ − − *(1 ) aR EI q p c .
So in the interval (2.2.7), it is optimal for the government to permit tax
evasion of taxpayers with high incomes and to get revenue through pen-
alties. The costs of such collection turns out to be less than the cost
of the optimal evasion-proof strategy (that provides the same gross
revenue).
Fig. 1 summarizes our results on the optimal government strategy under
condition (2.2.5).
If − < ∆ ≤*(1 ) ac q p q I c , then the optimal government strategy corresponds
to Fig. 2. In the interval
∆ − − ≤ − < ∆* min(1 ) a altq I c q p I I q I ,
the optimal strategy is = = ∆ =( , 0, 0)L LMT T p T . The gross and net reve-
nue under this strategy is = < ∆LMR T EI .
In the interval
≤ − < ∆ − − *min0 (1 )alt aI I q I c q p ,
the optimal strategy is ( = ,L LMT T  =
*,ap p ∆ = ∆ −( ) /LMT EI T q ), as in the
interval (2.2.8) under (2.2.5).
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Finally, under ∆ ≤ − *(1 ) aq I c q p , lump-sum taxation always provides the
maximal revenue. If − < ∆minaltI I q I , then the optimal strategy is
(TL = TLM, p = 0, ∆T = 0).
 
Fig. 2. The optimal tax enforcement strategy under penalty
constraint a) and condition c(1 – q)p   < q∆I ≤ c. 
= ∆gR EI
= = ∆LR T EI
∆ − − *(1 ) aq I c q p
∆ = ∆ − LMq T EI T
δ= = +* 1/(1 )a ap p
= ∆ −R EI pc
=L LMT T
∆q I
− minaltI I
= =L LMR T T
= ∆ =0, 0p T
Evasion proof                        Lump sum tax 
0 
* 
a 
− minaltI I∆q I
δ= = +* 1/(1 )a ap p
∆ −
=
∆
LMEI Tp
Iq
∆ = ∆ − LMq T EI T
= ∆ =0, 0p T
δ
 
−∆ − 
+ 
1
1
1 a
q
q I
= ∆F I
= = ∆LR T EI
=L LMT T
= ∆gR EI
Fig. 1. The optimal tax enforcement strategy under penalty
constraint Fa = (1 +δa)∆T and condition c < q∆I.
I Evasion proof          II Tax evasion         III Lump sum tax
0
= ∆ −R EI pc
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Let us discuss this result. Return to the case < ∆c q I . Since ∆I  charac-
terizes the variance of the income distribution (under a fixed q ), we may
say that lump-sum taxation is optimal when the variance is sufficiently
small with respect to the difference between altI  and minI . If the vari-
ance is relatively large, then the optimal strategy is evasion-proof, and in
the intermediate interval, the optimal government strategy permits tax
evasion. Another interpretation relates to the values ∆EI  and LMT .
Note that inequalities (2.2.6 – 2.2.8) are equivalent to
≤ − ∆0 LMT EI ,
δ
−
< ∆ − < ∆
+
1
0
1LM a
q
EI T q I ,
δ
 
−∆ ≤ ∆ − < ∆ 
+ 
1
1 LMa
q
q I EI T q I ,
respectively. Since the difference ∆ − LMEI T  characterizes the profitabil-
ity of production versus its stability, we may conclude that lump-sum
taxation is optimal when profitability is relatively low (area (2.2.6)), the
monotone tax and the audit strategy enforcing honest reporting are op-
timal where profitability is relatively high (2.2.8), and the monotone tax
and the audit strategy permitting tax evasion are optimal in the interme-
diate area (2.2.7). Fig. 2 shows that if the cost of an audit is relatively
high ≥ ∆( )c q I , then lump-sum taxation is more profitable than allowing
tax evasion in the intermediate area. In other respects the picture is
similar to the previous case.
The intuition for this result is as follows.
The whole set of government strategies divides into three subsets: area
I, where ≥ ∆ > 0pF T  and honest reporting is optimal for taxpayers; area
II, where ∆ > > 0T pF  and it is optimal to evade paying taxes; and area
III, where ∆ = 0T . In the latter area, the optimal auditing rule is obvious:
= 0p  and the maximal revenue under < ∆LMT EI  is LMT  irrespective of
the penalty constraint.
In areas I and II the optimal strategy includes the maximal possible lump-
sum tax =L LMT T  (its collection does not require any audit costs). In area
II the revenue is collected in the form of penalties. The maximal gross
revenue is ∆EI . In order to get it, we set = ∆ −( ) /LMpF EI T q . Under this
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condition, the penalty should be as large as possible, since we aim to
minimize audit costs. Because of participation constraint (2.2.4),
= ∆maxF I . Condition (2.2.5) shows that collection of penalties is profit-
able under such fine.
In area I the revenue comes from taxes. By similar argumentation,
∆ = ∆ −( ) /LMT EI T q , and the minimal audit probability that makes honest
reporting optimal is *.ap  By comparing 
*
ap  with the optimal audit prob-
ability in area II, we determine the border between areas II and III. In
other cases, the reasoning is similar. See Appendix for the detailed
proof.
Now consider constraint b) δ= ∆ + ∆bF T I .
Proposition 2.2.2. Let δ< ∆ + <, 1bc q I q . Then in the area
δ∆ + < − < ∆min( )b altq I q I I q I
the optimal strategy includes: = ,L LMT T  the additional tax δ∆ = ∆ −(1 )bT I
(hence, = ∆ )F I , the audit probability
∆ −
=
∆
LMEI Tp
q I
 min1 /alt
I I
T F
q I
− 
= − < ∆ ∆  ,
so this strategy permits tax evasion. The gross revenue gR  is ∆EI , and
the net revenue = ∆ −R EI pc .
In the area
δ< − ≤ ∆ +min0 ( )alt bI I q I q
the optimal strategy is
= ,L LMT T  ∆ = ∆ −( ) /LMT EI T q , δ= ∆ ∆ + ∆* /( )b bp T T I .  (*)
Honest behavior of taxpayers is optimal, and the gross revenue gR  is
again ∆EI  while the net revenue = ∆ − − *(1 ) bR EI q p c . For any other val-
ues of the parameters, either strategy (*) or the lump-sum tax
= = ∆ =( , 0, 0)L LMT T p T  are optimal.
Proof is given in Appendix. Note that, in contrast to case a, if the penalty
coefficient δb  is sufficiently large ( > −1 )q , then the optimal contract is
always evasion-proof.
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Thus, for certain parameter values, the optimal contract implies tax eva-
sion under constraints a or b. This is in contrast to cases c and d, where
an optimal contract, which is evasion-proof, always exists according to
Theorem 2.1.1.
Let us specify the optimal strategies. Consider the problem under
c) ≤ − −
!
H LF I I T .
Proposition 2.2.3. In the area ∆ > LMEI T , the optimal government strat-
egy is
( =L LMT T , ∆ = ∆ − = = − −
!
( ) / ,
def
LM c H LMT EI T q F F I I T ,
= = ∆ /
def
c cp p T F ) if > −(1 )cqF q c .
Then the gross revenue gR  is ∆EI  while the net revenue
= ∆ − −(1 ) cR EI q p c . Under ≤ −(1 )cqF q c , the lump-sum tax =( L LMT T ,
= ∆ =0, 0)p T  is optimal for the government.
Proposition 2.2.4. Under penalty constraint d) δ= ∆d dF I , the optimal
government strategy in the area ∆ ≥ LMEI T  is
=( ,L LMT T  ∆ = ∆ −( ) / ,LMT EI T q  = = ∆ / )
def
d dp p T F  if > −(1 )dqF q c .
Then the gross revenue gR  is ∆EI  while the net revenue
= ∆ − −(1 ) dR EI q p c . Otherwise, the lump-sum tax = =( , 0L LMT T p ,
∆ = 0)T  is optimal for the government.
See Appendix for the proofs.
Now, let us compare the penalty constraints from the point of view of the
government.
Under any constraint a, b or d, the maximal revenue increases (or, at
least does not decrease) in the penalty coefficient δ δ,a b  or δd  respec-
tively, and tends to the first best value ∆EI  as the coefficient tends to in-
finity. Under constraint c, the same proposition holds if we set δ = −
!
c I .
So the most reasonable way to compare the penalty constraints is to find
the equivalent values of the penalty coefficients. According to Proposi-
tions 2.2.1 – 2.2.4, we should consider several areas of parameters of
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the model. Let us start with − < ∆min ,altI I q I
δ δ≥ *max{0, }a a  where 
2
* min
min
,
def
alt
a
alt
I I q I
q I I I
δ − − ∆=
∆ − +
(2.2.10)
δ *a  is a solution of the equation
δ
− 
− = ∆ − + min
1
1 .
1alt
q
I I q I
Note that under − < ∆2minaltI I q I  such a solution is negative.
Let NxR  denote the maximal net revenue in strategy set ∈{ , , }N I II III  un-
der constraint ∈{ , , , }x a b c d . Then ≥I IIa aR R  under (2.2.10) by Proposition
2.2.1. The optimal strategy in area I is
* 1, ,
1
def
LM
LM
a
EI T
T T T T p
q δ
∆ −∆ = ∆ = = =
+
, (2.2.11)
and the penalty for evasion is δ= ∆ +*(1 )aF T . Let us determine δ
!
,b I  and
δd  from the following equations:
δ δ δ= ∆ + = ∆ + ∆ = ∆ + − = ∆
!* *
min(1 )a b dF T T I I I I I . (2.2.12)
Then for any penalty constraint, strategy (2.2.11) is optimal in area I.
Government revenue and the incomes of all agents do not depend on
the penalty constraint under (2.2.11 – 2.2.12). Since the optimal strategy
in area III (where ∆ = 0)T  and IIIxR  do not depend on the penalty con-
straint, the same proposition is true for the globally optimal strategy.
Thus, relation (2.2.12) determines the equivalent penalty coefficients un-
der (2.2.11).
Now consider − > ∆2min ,altI I q I  δ δ∈ *(0, ).a a  Then >II Ia aR R , and the opti-
mal strategy in area II is
1 a
I
T
δ
∆∆ =
+
 (so = ∆F I ), =L LMT T , LM
EI T
p
q I
∆ −
=
∆
.
Note that government revenue and income distributions of taxpayers do
not depend on δa  since the agents evade taxes. Thus, all values
δ δ∈ *{0, }a a  are equivalent in this sense. The only component that
changes is a nominal tax rate ∆ .T
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It is easy to check that δ∆ + = ∆ −* *(1 ) (1 )aT I q . Equations (2.2.12) deter-
mine equivalent values δ
!* *,b I  and δ *d  for δ *a :
* * 2
* min ,a altb
T I I q I
I q I
δδ ∆ − − ∆= =
∆ ∆
δ δ∆= + = −
∆
*
* *(1 ) 1d a
T
q
I
,
− = ∆
!*
minI I q I .
But ≤
!
minI I , so the equivalent value 
!*I  exists only for
*
1.
def
a a
I
T
δ δ ∆≥ = −
∆
Note that δ = ∆( ) .aF I
Under constraint b, >II Ib bR R  if δ δ< < *0 b b  and − > ∆2min .altI I q I  The op-
timal strategy in II is the same, except for δ∆ = ∆ −(1 )bT I  (such that
= ∆ )F I , and brings the same incomes, gross and net revenues. All
δ δ∈ *(0, )b b  and equivalent as well as δ δ∈ *(0, )a a .
Under constraint d, ≥I IId dR R , and for any δ δ< *d d
δ δ δ δ< = =* *( ) ( ) ( ) ( )I I I IId d d d a a a aR R R R
for δ δ∈ *(0, )a a . Thus, in contrast to cases a and b, net revenue de-
creases together with δd  until it reaches = .IIILM dT R
2.3 The optimal evasion-proof strategies
Now we return to the general model with income distribution ( )G I .
According to Theorem 2.1.1, the optimal contract is always evasion-
proof under penalty constraints c and d. Proceeding from Proposi-
tions 2.2.1 – 2.2.2, we may assume that the same is true under
constraints a or b if the penalty coefficients are sufficiently large. This
section finds the optimal evasion-proof strategy for problem
(2.1.2 – 2.1.4) under the following penalty constraint that generalizes
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a, b and d:
= ∆ + ∆F k T Il , where , 0k ≥l , ∆ = − rI I I ; ∆ = −( ) ( )rT T I T I ; (2.3.1)
note that a corresponds to = 0l , b — to = 1k , and d — to = 0k .
Moreover, we show that this strategy is optimal in general under certain
assumptions.
For any tax schedule T  let I — denote such minimal income that
=( ) ( )T I T I  for any >I I , that is, the tax is flat for greater incomes. Then
strategy = ( , )Gs T p  is evasion-proof under (2.3.1) if and only if
( )r
T
p I
F
∆
≥  for any > <,r rI I I I . (2.3.2)
So the tax optimization problem for evasion-proof strategies is as fol-
lows:
[ (.), (.)] max{ [ (.)] [ (.)]}gT p R T C p→ − , (2.3.3)
where
[ (.)] ( ) ( )gR T T I dG I= ∫
is gross revenue,
[ (.)] ( ) ( )C p c p I dG I= ∫
is the total audit cost, the government strategy meets condition (2.3.2)
and participation constraints
[ (.)] ( ) ,g altR T EI IdG I I≤ ∆ = −∫ (2.3.4)
≤ ≤ − min0 ( )T I I I . (2.3.5)
The following propositions characterize the optimal tax schedule and
audit rule for problem (2.3.1 – 2.3.5).
Proposition 2.3.1. The optimal tax schedule T  is concave, that is,
λ λ λ λ+ − ≥ + −1 2 1 2( (1 ) ) ( ) (1 ) ( )T I I T I T I  for any <1 2I I , λ ∈ [0,1] . For any con-
cave tax schedule, the optimal audit probability is
−
+= +
' 1( , ) ( / ( ))r rp I T k T Il , (2.3.6)
where +
'( )rT I  is the marginal tax rate for income rI .
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Proof. Note that gross revenue gR  does not depend on the audit rule in
this case. For any tax schedule T , the optimal evasion-proof audit rule
that minimizes the audit cost is
∆ >
= ∆ ∆ + ∆
0
( ) sup[ /( )]
I
p I T k T Il
for any
<I I , =( ) 0p I  for any ≥I I . (2.3.7)
So the optimal probability of an audit of any report rI  is equal to the
minimum that makes reporting rI  unprofitable for any > rI I .
Assume from the contrary that T  is not concave. Then its linear ap-
proximation in some interval lies above T  (see Fig. 3). Let us change T
for its linear approximation in this interval and denote the new tax sched-
ule by *T ; then, gross revenue will increase. Proceeding from (2.3.7),
the optimal probability will not increase for any rI  because
∆ ∆
=
∆ ∆
*
sup sup
T T
I I
for any ≤ 1I I  or ≥ 2I I , and
∆ ∆
≥
∆ ∆
*
sup sup
T T
I I
for any ∈ 1 2( , )I I I . The only problem is that 
*( )gR T  may not meet con-
straint (2.3.4).
For any schedule T  and tax level ∈ [0, ( )]HY T I , let YT  denote the fol-
lowing tax schedule: =( ) ( )YT I T I  if ≤( )T I Y , otherwise =( )T I Y . Note that
( )g YR T  continuously changes from 0  to ( )gR T  while Y  changes from 0
till ( )HT I . The optimal audit probability ( , )r Yp I T  does not decrease in Y
for any rI . So, if 
*( )gR T  exceeds ∆EI , then we can choose < ( )HY T I
such that = ∆( )g YR T EI , and reduce audit costs. Hence T  is not optimal.
Finally, for any concave tax schedule, the ratio ∆ ∆/T I  does not increase
in ∆I , so we obtain expression (2.3.6) from (2.3.7) as ∆I  tends to 0 .
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Note. CW obtained similar results under the penalty constraint = ∆F I .
This proposition also holds if the penalty is progressive in ∆I , that is, k
depends on ∆I  and increases in it.
Let there exist a density ρ =( ) ( ) /I dG I dI  of the income distribution and
µ ρ= −( ) (1 ( )) / ( )I G I I  denote its hazardous rate. For typical statistic distri-
butions, such as lognormal, uniform etc., this rate decreases in I . The
following theorem finds the optimal evasion-proof government strategy
for any income distribution with a decreasing hazardous rate. If
∆ ≤ LMEI T  then, according to Proposition 2.1.2, the optimal strategy is
lump-sum tax ≡ ∆T EI . Now let ∆ > LMEI T .
Theorem 2.3.2. If µ( )I  decreases in I , then the optimal tax schedule T
for problem (2.3.1 – 2.3.5) meets the following conditions: there exists
I  such that = − min( )T I I I  for any ≤I I  and =( ) ( )T I T I  for any >I I . The
optimal threshold I  meets either conditions = ∆( )gR T EI  and
>
+
( )
c
I
k
µ
l
, or < ∆( )gR T EI  and = +
( )
c
I
k
µ
l
.
The optimal audit rule is ≡ +( ) 1/( )p I k l  for <I I , ≡( ) 0p I  for ≥I I .
 
2I1I
T
*T
Fig. 3. 
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Moreover, if the penalty is proportional to the unpaid tax (penalty con-
straint a: 1 , 0ak δ= + =l ), the specified strategy is optimal in general for
initial problem (2.1.2 – 2.1.4).
See Appendix for the proof.
The intuition is that, under the optimal audit rule, net tax revenue mo-
notonously depends on marginal tax rates +
'( )T I , so the optimal rate is
either the maximal =( 1)  or the minimal =( 0) . Since T  is concave by
Proposition 2.3.1, it corresponds to Fig. 4.
Thus, the optimal tax takes the whole income above the minimum for
<I I  and is flat for incomes above I . The optimal audit strategy is a
known cut-off rule (see Sanchez, Sobel, 1993): reports below threshold
I  are audited with the minimal probability that makes tax evasion un-
profitable, and reports above I  are not audited.
 
=T I
LI HII
+
1
k l
LI
p
o45
T 
Fig. 4. The optimal evasion proof strategy under Imin = 0, 
∆EI > TLM (= IL).  
I 
TAX OPTIMIZATION UNDER TAX EVASION28
We conclude this section by comparing different penalty constraints.
Theorem 2.3.2 shows that the optimal evasion-proof strategy and net
revenue do not depend on the ratio of penalty coefficients k  and l . The
penalty proportional to the unpaid tax is equivalent to the penalty pro-
portional to the hidden income since the optimal tax is equal to the in-
come above the minimal level. Expenses for auditing decrease and net
revenue increases in the sum +k l .
3. A MORE GENERAL MODEL OF AN AUDIT
3.1. Model specification
The standard audit model that we followed in Section 2 assumes that
there are only two possible outcomes of the interaction between a tax-
payer and the tax service: either there is no audit and no detected eva-
sion, or an audit detects the whole hidden income at a fixed cost. How-
ever, this assumption typically does not hold in practice. Consider the
following examples.
1. Let a taxpayer get her income from the trade of some good. Every
unit of the good brings a fixed income i  before tax. The volume of sales
is a random value with a given distribution. For technical convenience let
= 1i . Then distribution ( )G I  is the same for the income and for the vol-
ume of sales.
In order to evade paying tax, a taxpayer registers only some part rI  of
her sales. The rest is sold for cash without registration. In order to detect
tax evasion, auditors secretly observe all sales within some period and
then check whether the sold production was registered. Their effort e  is
proportional to the checked production volume. If unregistered sales are
randomly distributed in the whole set of sales, then the probability of
detecting unregistered income d  depends on the total and registered
volumes and the auditors' effort as follows: −
−
=( | , , ) /
r r
d e d e
r II I Ip d I I e C C C ,
where = −!( )!/ !eIC e I e I  is a binomial coefficient.
2. If in the previous example all unregistered sales are concentrated
within some interval in the whole period of sales, then
= − = − −(0| , , ) ( ) / , ( | , , ) ( ) /r r r rp I I e I e I p e I I e I I e I , and the distribution is
uniform for ∈ (0, )d e .
Note that in both cases the expected detected unreported income is
= −( , , ) ( ) /r rEd I I e e I I I .
3. A MORE GENERAL MODEL OF AN AUDIT 29
3. Consider the case where auditors check reports after the sale is over
and cannot distinguish the registered production, but only evaluate the
total amount. The accounted production is proportional to the auditors'
effort. Then detected unregistered income is =( , , ) 0rd I I e  if ≤ re I , − re I
if ∈ ( , )re I I , − rI I  for >e I .
Note. In practice the tax service usually can adjust its effort
to the total income and does not apply >e I . The results below
stay valid for such modification of the model. The standard audit model
used in Section 2 is formally equivalent to the case where π=e ,
π π π π= − − =(0| , , ) 1 , ( | , , )r r rp I I p I I I I .
The formal setting of the tax enforcement optimization problem for a
given detection probability is quite similar to (2.1.1 – 2.1.4). We assume
that under a given government strategy [ ( ), ( )]G r rs T I e I= , each taxpayer
aims to maximize her expected income. So, depending on the actual in-
come, her report is
( , ) min{ ( ) [ , , ( )] ( , )} ( , )
r
def
r G r r r eff GrI d
I I s T I p d I I e I F d I T I s→ + =∑ .
The problem of the government (2.1.2) and the constraint on the ex-
pected income of a taxpayer stay the same. The constraint on the mini-
mal after-tax income is now min[ ( )] [ , ( )]r rT I I F d I I I I+ ≤ −  for any ∈   ,rd I I .
The variants of penalty schemes are as follows:
a) ( , ) (1 )[ ( ) ( )]r r rF d I T I d T Iδ= + + − ;
b) δ= + − +( , ) ( ) ( )r r rF d I T I d T I d ;
c) ≤ ≤ + − −
!
0 ( , ) ( )r r rF d I I d T I I  for any ∈   ,rd I I ,
where 
!
I  is a minimal income under the non-optimal behavior of a tax-
payer;
d) δ=( , )rF d I d .
3.2. On optimality of evasion-proof contracts
Now our purpose is to find out under what conditions it is possible to
generalize Theorem 2.1.1 for the given model.
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Theorem 3.2.1. If the detection probability function meets condition
≤(0| , , ) (0| , , )rp I Y e p I I e  for any > ≥ rI Y I  and e , (3.2.1)
then under penalty constraint c there exists an evasion-proof optimal
contract for the tax optimization problem from Section 3.1. The same
proposition is true under penalty constraint d, if this function meets con-
dition
+ ≥( , , ) ( , , ) ( , , )r rEd I Y e Ed Y I e Ed I I e  for any > ≥ rI Y I . (3.2.2)
The scheme of the proof is standard (cf. CW, Lemma 3 on p.177). Con-
sider a contract = ( , )Gs T e  such that ≠( , )r GI I s I  for some I . Let us de-
fine a new contract * *( , )T e  such that * *( ) ( , ), ( ) [ ( , )]eff G r GT I T I s e I e I I s= = .
In Appendix we show that under specified conditions this new contract is
evasion-proof and equivalent to the original for all agents including the
government.
Let us discuss conditions (3.2.1, 3.2.2). Both of them hold for the stan-
dard audit model and, moreover, for any model where ( | , , )rp d I I e  does
not depend on rI . The second condition is also true for examples 1, 2,
3, and seems to be rather general. However, none of these examples
meets the first condition, so maybe the optimal contract under constraint
c is not typically evasion-proof for the general model of audit.
3.3. The general contract approach
Consider a model given by the distribution of income ( )G I , the cost ( )C e
of an audit effort, and the probability ( | , )dp I I e  of detecting income dI
under actual income I  and audit effort e . A general contract Gc  for this
model consists of a set of messages M , a tax function ( )T m , ∈m M ,
an audit function ( )e m  and a penalty function ( , )dF I m . The only differ-
ence with the previous model is that message m  may have another
meaning than the reported income.
Setting of the optimal contract problem is similar to (2.1.1 – 2.1.4). Each
taxpayer aims to maximize her expected income. So depending on the
actual income, her message is
→ + =∑( , ) min{ ( ) ( , ( )) ( , )} ( , )
d
def
G d d eff G
m I
m I c T m p I I e m F I m T I c . (3.3.1)
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The problem of the government is to maximize tax revenue net of audit-
ing costs
{ ( , ) [ ( ( , ))]} ( ) max
G
eff G G
c
T I c C e m I c dG I− →∫  (3.3.2)
under the following participation constraints:
[ ( , )] ( )eff G altI T I c dG I I− ≥∫ , (3.3.3)
that is, the expected income of an agent under her optimal behavior
should exceed the alternative income.
The constraint on the minimal after-tax income is now
min[ ( )] [ , ( )]dT m I F I m I I I+ ≤ −  (3.3.4)
for any dI  possible under I  and ( )e m ,
and an analog of penalty constraint c for the general contract model is
≤ ≤ − −
!
0 ( , ) ( )d dF I m I T m I  (3.3.5)
for any possible , dm I .
Any government strategy, or simple contract, considered in Sections
2.1 – 3.2 is a particular case of a general contract with the set
= [ , ]L HM I I . The following result shows that it is possible to limit the op-
portunities of the government with simple contracts without any loss of
revenue.
Theorem 3.3.1. For any general contract Gc  there exists an equivalent
simple contract Gs  such that
1) *[ ( , )] [ ( , )]r G Ge I I s e m I c= ,
2) =* ( , ) ( , )eff G eff GT I s T I c  for any I ,
and, moreover, for any income I , distribution of the after-tax income is
the same for both contracts.
See Appendix for the proof.
Note that under penalty constraint (3.3.5) there exists, according to the
Theorem 3.2.1, the optimal simple contract that is evasion-proof. Condi-
tion (3.2.1) holds in this case since the detection probability depends
only on I  and e . Thus, the optimal evasion-proof simple contract pro-
vides the maximal revenue in problem (3.3.2 – 3.3.5).
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The possibility of introducing any analog of constraints a, b, d, or, more
generally, the principle that "the punishment should meet the crime" in
the general contract framework has still to be investigated. The given ex-
amples show that reporting of income in practice often essentially differs
from sending an abstract message. For these reasons the general con-
tract approach is not so useful in investigating tax enforcement prob-
lems.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we have studied the tax optimization problem under tax
evasion for a group of taxpayers with random, independent and equally
distributed incomes. Our results clarify the role of participation and pen-
alty constraints in determining the optimal tax enforcement strategy.
According to the known Welfare theorem, if the government has com-
plete information on the income distribution, and the taxpayers are risk-
neutral, then it is optimal to impose a lump-sum tax, and not to organize
an audit. However, if there exists a constraint on the minimal income un-
der the worst state of nature, then it may be optimal to combine a lump-
sum tax with other types of taxes. In this case the maximal lump-sum tax
is limited, on the one hand, by the value that can undermine a firm's ac-
tivity under unfortunate production conditions, and on the other hand, by
the expected surplus profit before tax with respect to the desirable level
of after-tax profit for this group.
Our results show that it is always optimal to set the maximal lump-sum
tax under the mentioned constraints. If the surplus value is relatively
small, then introduction of any other tax does not increase net revenue.
But if the profit distribution is widely dispersed and the cost of an audit is
relatively low, then the optimal evasion-proof contract has the following
structure: all incomes below some threshold are taxed to the minimum
income, and for all higher incomes the tax is flat. The optimal audit strat-
egy is a known "cut-off" rule: reports below the threshold are audited
with the minimal probability that makes tax evasion unprofitable and the
rest of the reports are not audited. In some sense the optimal contract
does not depend on the penalty rule: it does not matter if the penalty is
proportional to the evaded tax or the hidden income, or includes both
components. Since the tax is equal to the whole income above the mini-
mal level, only the sum of penalty coefficients matters.
In order to find the optimal threshold income, we may start with the low-
est level and increase it until the marginal expenses of an audit exceed
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the marginal revenue or the expected after-tax profit of the agents
reaches its desirable level.
Our formal result is similar to the known propositions on the optimality
of regressive taxes (see Mirrlees, CW and others). However, note that
the expected income is the same for every taxpayer in our case. We
just show that it is optimal to praise fortunate agents with higher in-
comes.
Surprisingly, this result is relevant to the practice of taxation in Russia. A
typical approach is that, for any tax period, the tax service establishes
normative tax levels for firms under its supervision proceeding from ex
ante information on these firms and some general characteristics of the
market in this period (see Metodika, 1997). Such a tax level corresponds
to the threshold tax in our model. Only firms that do not pay this norma-
tive tax are carefully audited and penalized. One essential difference
from our model is that the tax (as well as the penalty) may have another
form and the proceeds are not included in the government revenue, but
in another fund (for instance, a "voluntary" donation that contributes to
some funds of the local administration, see Yakovlev, 2000). Note that
criminal groups use a similar approach to enterprises under their control.
But this is another story.
One difficulty related to this approach is how to determine desirable
after-tax incomes for different groups of taxpayers. From the theoretical
point of view, these values should proceed from the solution of the gen-
eral welfare optimization problem for the economy. In this context our
paper permits exclusion of the tax evasion issue from this general prob-
lem since we have determined the minimal cost of tax collection for a
given desirable income.
An important issue is whether the specified contract is optimal in gen-
eral, that is, the optimal tax policy of the government is always evasion-
proof. In contrast to the conventional point of view (see Chander and
Wilde (1998), Mookherjee and Png (1989) and others), we found that
under certain conditions the optimal government strategy permits tax
evasion if the penalty for evasion is a surcharge on the unpaid tax or the
fine is proportional to the hidden income. This happens if there are two
possible levels of income, the penalty for evasion is sufficiently soft and
the profitability of production is neither very high, nor very low, but ex-
ceeds the difference between the minimal value of random income and
permissible income (recall Fig. 1).
However, for typical continuous distributions of income (uniform, expo-
nential and others), the optimal evasion-proof contract is optimal in gen-
eral if the penalty is proportional to the evaded tax.
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In this paper we put aside two practically important problems. We con-
sider a group of taxpayers with identically distributed incomes, but actu-
ally the government deals with heterogeneous taxpayers. In many cases
it has rather incomplete information on their initial characteristics (that is,
income distributions), and cannot propose the type-specific contract. We
obtained some results for the model of such sort with nonrandom
incomes in a complementary paper by Marhuenda, Vasin, and Vasina
(2000). However, investigation of the model including both kinds of in-
formational asymmetry remains a challenging task.
Another important issue is corruption in the tax administration. (Recent
research on this subject has been done by Hindriks et al., 1999.) Let us
note that inclusion of a possibility of collusion between a taxpayer and
her auditor in our model does not essentially change the formal results
on the optimal government strategy. By introducing premiums to auditors
for revealing tax evasion, the government can eliminate incentives for
accepting bribes and obtain the same optimal tax revenue (see Vasin
and Panova, 1999). Kofman and Lawarree (1993, 1996) derive a similar
result for the Principal-Supervisor-Agent model in another context. The
role of giving incentives to the state officials in fighting corruption was
also recognized within the economic literature (see Bardhan, 1977). The
actual problem is that the condition of random interaction between tax-
payers and auditors in the mentioned models is in contradiction with the
reality in many cases. For long-time relations between a taxpayer and an
auditor, the mentioned scheme of premiums is not so efficient. So, this
problem needs additional investigation.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 2.2.1. Proceeding from Proposition 2.1.2, it suffices
to study the case − < ∆minaltI I q I . Let =y pF  denote an actual expected
payment to the budget from the additional income. The tax optimization
problem in area II can be set as
+ − → maxLT qy pc (A.1)
under
+ ≤ ∆ ≤ + ≤ + ∆, , .L L LM L LM
y
T qy EI T T T T I
p
Under any permissible >, 0,LT y  the optimal p  turns the latter relation
into equity. Thus, we should maximize
= + − − + ∆( , ) /( )
def
L L LM LR T y T qy cy T T I
in the area represented in Fig. 5.
0                  TLM                  ∆EI         TL
Fig. 5.
y
TL + qy = ∆EI
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Condition (2.2.5) implies that ( , )LR T y  increases in y  under any permis-
sible LT . On the line + = ∆LT qy EI , the revenue is ∆ − ( )EI cp y , where
( )
LM
y
p y
I T EI qy
=
∆ + − ∆ +
.
The audit probability increases in y  and reaches its minimum at
∆ −
= =
( )
, LML LM
EI T
T T y
q
.
Thus, the maximal revenue is
II LMEI TR EI c
Iq
∆ −
= ∆ −
∆
, = ∆F I .
In order to find the optimal government strategy, it suffices to compare
IIR  with the maximal revenues in areas I and III. In the latter area
=
III
LMR T  since ∆ = 0T . Thus, >
II IIIR R  because of (2.2.5).
In area I,
δ
= ∆ − −
+
(1 )
1
I cR EI q
and >II IR R  if
δ
∆ − −
<
∆ +
1
1
LMEI T q
Iq
,
that is, equivalent to
min
1
1
1alt
q
I I q I
δ
− 
− > ∆ − +  .
If ∆ ≤q I c , then ≥III IIR R , and ≥III IR R  if − ≥ ∆ − − *min (1 )alt aI I q I c q p .
Proof of Proposition 2.2.2. In area II, setting and solving the tax optimi-
zation problem is the same as under a):
min, ;II LM alt
EI T q I I I
F I p
q I q I
∆ − ∆ − +
= ∆ = =
∆ ∆
the only difference is that δ∆ = ∆ −(1 )bT I  in this case. In area I,
∆ > ⇒LMEI T max[ (1 ) ]
I
LR T q T q cp= + ∆ − −
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under constraints
δ∆ + ∆ ≥ ∆( )p T I T , ≤ + ∆ ≤ ∆ ∆ ≤ ∆, ,L LM LT T T q T EI T I .
Then
δ
∆
=
∆ + ∆
I Tp
T I
,
and net revenue reaches its maximum when LT q T EI+ ∆ = ∆ , = ,L LMT T
minaltI IT I
q
−∆ = ∆ − .
As well as under a), = ,III LMR T  and >
II IIIR R  if ∆ >q I c . On the other
hand, >II IR R  if
(1 )II ILM
EI T
p p q
q I
∆ −
= < −
∆
.
δ∆ − + ∆ < ∆ −(1 )LM bEI T q I q I q δ⇔ + ∆ < − < ∆min( )b altq q I I I q I .
If ∆ ≤q I c  then >III IIR R , and >III IR R  if
δ
∆ −
≥ ∆ − −
∆ − + ∆
(1 ) LMLM
LM b
EI T
T EI c q
EI T q I
⇔
⇔ min(1 ) (1 ) ( )b altc q q I I Iδ+ ≥ ∆ + − − ⇔
⇔ δ∆ ≥ − ≥ ∆ + − −min (1 ) (1 )alt bq I I I q I c q .
Proof of Proposition 2.2.3 In area I, we aim to maximize
(1 )I LR T q T q cp= + ∆ − −  under constraints
+ ≤ −
!
L HF T I I , ≤ + ∆ ≤ ∆,L LM LT T T q T EI  and ≥ ∆pF T .
Thus, the optimal
∆
=
* Tp
F
, = − −
!*( )L H LF T I I T .
If > −(1 )cqF q c  for any ≤L LMT T , then
*
(1 )
0
( )L
q c
q
F T
−
− >
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for any ≤L LMT T , + ∆ = ∆
* *
LT q T EI  and the optimal 
*
LT  minimizes the
audit probability proportional to
∆ −
− −
! L
H L
EI T
I I T
.
Since > >
!
min ,altI I I  ∆ = + ∆ − < −
!
L alt HEI I q I I I I , and =
*
L LMT T .
If ≤ −(1 )cqF q c  then ∆ =
* 0T , =*L LMT T .
Proof of Proposition 2.2.4 is similar to the previous one. The only differ-
ence is that δ= ∆* ,d dF I  so ∆ + = ∆* *Lq T T EI  if > −(1 ) .dqF q c
Proof of Theorem 2.3.2. According to Proposition 2.3.1, we can express
the net revenue under the optimal audit strategy as follows:
−
+ +− +∫ ' ' 1{ ( )[ ( ) ( ( ) ) ]} ( )T I I kT I dG Iµ l .
Since the hazardous rate and +
'T  decrease in I , the coefficient after +
'T
monotonously decreases in I . Thus, under the optimal T , the marginal
tax rate +
'T  is maximal, that is, equal to 1, till some I , and is minimal,
that is equal to 0 for incomes greater than I .
Let ( )R I  (respectively ( )gR I ) denote net (respectively gross) revenue
under the tax schedule with threshold I . Then
= − + −
+∫( ) ( )( ) [1 ( )] ,
L
I
I
c
R I I I dI G I I
k l
ρ
 
′ = − − + − + ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( )
c
R I I I I I G I
k
ρ ρ
l
.
If
>
+
( )L
c
I
k
µ
l
then ( )R I  is a unimodal function with a unique maximum at point "I
such that
>
+
"( ) cI
k
µ
l
.
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The optimal threshold *I  is equal to "I  if ≤ ∆"( )gR I EI , otherwise
= ∆*( )gR I EI . Under the opposite inequality
≤
+
( )L
c
I
k
µ
l
,
lump-sum tax ≡ LMT T  is optimal.
Now consider the case where = = +0, 1 ak δl . In this case condition
(2.1.4) takes the form
+ − ≤ − min( ) { ( ) [ ( )]}a rT I T I T I I I Iδ  if >( ) 0q I (a)
and ≤ − min[ ( )]rT I I I I  if <( ) 1q I . (b)
Here ( ) [ ( )]rq I p I I=  is an effective probability of an audit for taxpayers
with income I .
Below we prove the theorem under condition
≤ − min( )T I I I  for any I . (A.2)
If >( ) 0q I  then (a) implies (A.2). We conjecture that this condition is not
binding if =( ) 0q I  and ≠( )rI I I . In any case such constraint seems to be
unrestrictive in our setting.
First consider the problem under (A.2) but without condition (2.1.4).
Let us study the optimization problem with respect to an audit rule under
a fixed non-decreasing tax schedule T . According to Sanchez and Sobel
(1993), the optimal audit rule is a solution to the problem
δ µ+= + − →∫ '
(.)
( (.)) ( )[(1 ) ( ) ( ) ] ( ) maxa
q
R q q I T I I c dG I
under the following constraints: ( )q I  does not increase in I ,
δ −∈ + 1( ) [0,(1 ) ]aq I ,
δ µ+= + ≤ ∆∫ '( (.)) ( )(1 ) ( ) ( ) ( )g aR q q I T I I dG I EI . (A.3)
Proposition 2 in Sanchez and Sobel shows that there always exists a so-
TAX OPTIMIZATION UNDER TAX EVASION40
lution of the form:
δ+ ∈
= ∈
∈
!
!
1
*
1
1/(1 ) if [ , ),
( )             if [ , ),
0              if [ , ],
a L
H
I I I
q I p I I I
I I I
where 1
1
, 0,
1L H a
I I I I p δ
 
≤ ≤ ≤ ∈  
+ 
!
.
This effective probability is generated by an audit rule
1
*
1 2
2
1
   if  [ , ),
1
          if  [ , ),( )    
0          if  ,
L
a
I I I
p I I Ip I
I I
δ

∈ +
∈=  ≥
where 2I  meets equation 2 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) (1 )[ ( ) ( )].eff aT I T I T I p T I T Iδ= = + + −
! !
This result easily follows from the linear programming theory: (A.3) may
be considered as a linear programming problem with two constraints be-
sides monotonicity of ( )q I . Hence there exists solution *( )q I  and corre-
sponding *( )p I  which has at most two jumps. Moreover, if µ+' ( ) ( )T I I  does
not increase, then there exists a solution with only one jump, that is a
cut-off rule. Note that constraint (2.1.4) is not binding with respect to T
that meets (A.2) under any cut-off rule. Moreover, for any pair (.), (.)T p
where (.)p  is a cut-off rule with a threshold I , there exist an equivalent
evasion-proof strategy ( (.), (.))T p where
( ), ,
( )
( ), .
T I I I
T I
T I I I
 ≤
= 
>
In order to complete the proof, let us show that for any permissible
pair ( , )T q , including a 3-level effective audit probability in problem
(2.1.2 – 2.1.3, A.2), there exists permissible strategy * *( , )T q  where, for
any I , = −* min( )T I I I  (so T  is a concave tax schedule), 
*q  is either a
3-level or a cut-off audit rule and ≥* *( , ) ( , )R T q R T q .
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Consider the problem with respect to T  under fixed q . We can rewrite it
as follows:
= − →∫ ∫
!
(.)
( , ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) max
L
I
eff
T
I
R T q T I dG I c q I dG I
where
1
( ) [1 (1 )] ( ) (1 ) ( )eff a aT I p T I p T Iδ δ= − + + +  for ∈
!
1( , ]I I I , (A.4)
=( ) ( )effT I T I  for ≤ =
!
1, ( ) ( )eff effI I T I T I  for >
!
I I
under constraints:
= ≤∫( , ) ( ) ( )g effR T q T I dG I EI (A.5)
and (A.2).
If we exclude constraint (A.5), then *T  is a solution since *( ) ( )eff effT I T I≤ ,
proceeding from (A.4, A.2). If *( , )T q  does not meet (A.5) then consider
R  as a function of 
!
I  under fixed * 1,T I  and p . For ≤
!'
1I I  let us define
!'( | )q I I  as a cut-off rule with threshold 
!'I . Note that R  is continuous
and increases in 
!
I . Thus there exists ∈
! !'
1( , )I I I  such that = ∆
!* '( , )gR T I EI
and >
! !* '( , ) ( , )R T I R T I  because
= <∫ ∫ ∫
! !
!
'
'( | ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
L L
I I
I I
q I I dG I q I dG I q I dG I .
Proof of Theorem 3.2.1. Note that since T  is non-decreasing, *T  is also
non-decreasing. Let us prove that =*( )rI I I  under 
* *( , )T e . We aim to
show that
≥* *( , ) ( )T I Y T I  for any <Y I . (*)
Let
( ), [ ( )]r r rI I Y e e I Y= =  under ( , )T e .
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Then
≤ = + ∑*( ) ( , ) ( ) ( | , , ) ( , )r r r r
d
T I T I I T I p d I I e F d I ,
= + +∑ ∑*( , ) ( ) ( | , , ) ( , ) ( | , , ) ( , )r r r
d d
T I Y T I p d Y I e F d I p d I Y e p d Y .
Thus, under condition d, inequality (*) is equivalent to condition (3.2.2).
Under c, the inequality is equivalent to
+ ≠ − +
+ ≠ − ≥ + ≠ −
!
! !
(0| , , ) (0| , , ) ( ) (0| , , ) ( 0| , , )( )
( 0| , , )( ) (0, , , ) ( ) ( 0| , , )( ).
r r r
r r r
p I Y e p Y I e T I p I Y E p d Y I e y I
p d I Y e I I P I I e T I p d I I e I I
The latter follows from (3.2.1).
For example 1,
(0| , , )
e
Y
p I Y e
I
 
=   
(for small e ); for example 2, this probability is
Y e
I
−
for <e Y . For example 3, the latter inequality is equivalent to ≥Y I .
Thus, in all these cases (3.2.1) is not true in general.
Proof of Theorem 3.3.1. For a given contract Gc , for any message m ,
let ( )Inc m  denote a set of incomes such that =( , )Gm I c m . For any rI
such that = =( ) min ( )
def
r rI I m Inc m , and for some m , let =
*( ) ( ),re I e m
=
*( ) ( ),rT I T m  =
*( , ) ( , )d rF I I F I m . If ≠ ( )r rI I m  then let =
*( ) min{ ( )rT I T m  for
m  such that
≥( )r rI m I }, =
*( , ) max ( , )d r d
m
F I I F I m , *( ) [ ( )]r Le I e m I= .
Such definition preserves monotonicity of the tax function: if
[ ( )]T m I does not decrease in I , then *( )T I  does not decrease in I . Be-
sides that, if the original penalty function meets condition (3.3.5), then
the new function meets
≤ ≤ − −
!
0 * ( , ) * ( )d r d rF I I I T I I  for any possible ,d rI I .
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